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Since restricting the set of policy instruments available to member countries does not create a 
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countries is needed only when individual countries are either unable or unwilling to pursue 
desirable policies. 
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A monetary union sets union-wide monetary policy in the hope of achieving desirable out-
comes. When a monetary union is established, a classic question arises: How should the
scal policies of member states be coordinated? In particular, is it desirable to establish
a union-wide authority to coordinate the scal policies of member countries as well as to
implement international scal transfers between countries? Amid the recent debate about
the desirability of greater scal integration within the European Union, such a question has
regained center stage.
Before the advent of sophisticated international nancial markets, a widely accepted
belief was that within a monetary union, a union-wide authority orchestrating scal transfers
is desirable to provide adequate insurance against country-specic macroeconomic shocks.
In this paper, we examine whether the need for such an authority to provide cross-country
insurance is diminished as international nancial markets become more developed. In short:
Can international nancial markets substitute for a scal union?
One view, associated with Mundell (1973), is that sophisticated international nancial
markets are su¢ cient to provide insurance against country-specic uctuations. Mundell
illustrated this point using a simple example in which the world consists of two islands:
Capricorn, which is South of the equator and produces its crops in the fall, and Cancer,
which is North of the equator and produces its crops in the spring. Both countries are subject
to random uctuations in their crop output, and goods can be stored only for six months.
Mundell explains how, even with labor immobile across countries, well-developed insurance
markets can achieve the same outcomes that would be achieved if labor were perfectly mobile
and individuals migrated every six months to the countries in which crops can be grown. In
short, in Mundells view, international nancial markets can provide all the necessary cross-
country insurance, thereby obviating the need for a scal union to implement any transfer.
An alternative view, associated with Kenen (1969), is that transfers between regions
of a monetary union are critical to its functioning. Hence, Kenen argues that in a currency
union, the domain of scal policy ought to coincide with the currency area(Kenen 1969, p.
46). In this essay, Kenen also explains how a well-functioning scal union entails large-scale
transfers between regions in the face of country-specic uctuations.
We argue that the key di¤erence between Mundells and Kenens view of international
transfers can be traced back to their distinct ideas of what a union-wide authority should
accomplish. From Mundells point of view, the role of a union-wide authority is simply to
provide insurance to member countries, whereas from Kenens point of view, the role of
such an authority also entails performing an ex-ante redistribution of wealth, say, from richer
countries to poorer countries in a union. Our main result is that under Mundells view, the
advent of sophisticated nancial markets obviates the need for any such authority to provide
international transfers whereas under Kenens view, such a union-wide authority should play
an active role even in the presence of sophisticated nancial markets.
We consider several settings for policy. In our benchmark setting, member countries
policies are rich enough to correct all their domestic distortions. We then investigate a
restricted policy setting in which member countriespolicies are symmetrically constrained
in a way that prevents them from resolving all their domestic distortions. In both settings,
we nd support for Mundells view: if the role of a union-wide authority is simply to provide
insurance and its only instruments are transfers between countries, then there is still no need
for it to play an active role. In particular, restrictions on member countriespolicies do not
create a scal externality, whereby each country adopts a policy that is optimal for that
country but is suboptimal for the union as a whole.
The assumptions underlying our result are that: i) all countries are small in the rele-
vant sense, ii) the union-wide authority and member countries can commit to their policies,
iii) the union-wide authority has no advantage over national governments in its choice of
policy instruments, iv) the government of each country maximizes the welfare of its citizens,
and v) the union-wide authority maximizes a Pareto-weighted sum of each countries utilities,
with weights that ensure that the union-wide authority cares only about providing insurance
to member countries. If we dispense with any of these assumptions, a role for an active
union-wide authority emerges.
We illustrate this point by considering three settings that relax some of these assump-
tions. First, we allow the union-wide authority to have access to instruments that some of
the national governments do not have available. In particular, we envision a more powerful
union-wide authority that, in addition to its ability to impose international transfers, can
levy portfolio taxes on each member countriesinternational nancial transactions. This ex-
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pansive view of a union-wide authoritys powers goes well beyond the limited role envisioned
for it by Mundell, but is consistent with the role envisioned for it by Kenen. In this setting,
when the policies of member countries are restricted in various ways, it is typically optimal
for the union-wide authority to intervene by levying portfolio taxes on the countries facing
policy restrictions. The rationale for this intervention, however, is not specically to improve
cross-country insurance, but rather to help ameliorate domestic distortions in countries that
are unable to do so on their own.
Our rst setting might lead one to conjecture that the need to levy portfolio taxes is
intimately connected to countries belonging to a monetary union and that these taxes o¤set
cross-country externalities. Our second setting shows this conjecture is incorrect: if national
governments face constraints on their policies, then the union-wide authority of a scal union
typically has an incentive to intervene and impose portfolio taxes even when countries have
exible exchange rates.
In the settings considered so far, equilibrium outcomes, except for international trans-
fers, are invariant to whether a given policy is delegated to national governments or to the
union-wide authority. Our third setting is one in which this irrelevance of delegation of au-
thority result no longer holds. In this case, we allow for self-interested governments that
maximize objective functions that di¤er from those of their citizens and choose government
spending that only benets governments. We think of this environment as capturing the idea
that for a whole host of reasons, including political ones, some governments are unwilling to
pursue policies that are most desirable for their citizens. We show that in this scenario, it is
better to delegate the authority to levy portfolio taxes to a union-wide authority rather than
to national authorities.
These three scenarios clearly generate a role for an active union-wide authority. All of
them, however, clearly have a paternalistic avor: a responsible and powerful union-wide au-
thority should provide remedial help to its member countries. Indeed, a union-wide authority
intervenes only when its member countriesgovernments are either unable or unwilling to
pursue desirable policies.
In our analysis, we closely follow Farhi and Werning (2013), henceforth FW , by con-
sidering a simple one-period economy with a continuum of countries, each of which produces
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traded and nontraded goods. The nontraded goods sector consists of a continuum of monop-
olistically competitive intermediate goods rms that produce di¤erentiated products. The
prices of these rms are sticky in that they must be set before the realization of preference
and productivity shocks. The traded goods sector is competitive and has exible prices. This
economy builds on Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) and is a special case of Gali and Monacelli
(2005, 2008).
Even though we purposely follow FW closely in our analysis, we arrive at very di¤erent
conclusions. The key di¤erence between our work and that of FW is that we build in as part of
Mundells view the idea that the goal of a union-wide authority is simply to provide insurance
rather than to redistribute ex-ante wealth, whereas FW presume that a union-wide authority
is also concerned with redistribution over and above insurance.
Our benchmark scal policies grant each government a payroll tax on labor income, an
excise taxes on nontraded goods, and portfolio taxes, whereas restricted scal policies disallow
the use of nontraded goods taxes. The scal union features three tiers of decision makers.
At the top tier, a union-wide authority chooses international transfers between countries to
maximize a weighted sum of the welfare of consumers in each country. At the middle tier,
the governments of all countries, taking as given international transfers set by the union-wide
authority, noncooperatively choose their countriesscal policies, or simply national policies,
in order to maximize the welfare of the consumers of their country. At the bottom tier,
consumers and rms in each country, taking as given both the polices of the union-wide
authority and the national governments, make production and consumption decisions.
We begin by studying the need for a scal union when each national government
has access to the benchmark scal policies. We start with an incomplete market setting that
captures in a stark way the idea that before the modern era of international nancial markets,
cross-country insurance could only be provided through direct cross-country transfers. As
both Mundell and Kenen agree, in such an era there is a clear need for an active union-wide
scal authority.
We then consider a setting with complete international nancial markets. We think of
this complete market setting as capturing the idea that, in the modern era of sophisticated
international nancial markets, countries can rely on these markets to obtain cross-country
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insurance. The key question we address is: Does the advent of sophisticated nancial markets
obviate the need for an active union-wide authority? Our answer is that with complete
markets, a union-wide scal authority is unnecessary if and only if this authority is concerned
solely with providing insurance to member countries. That is, under Mundells view of the
role of a scal authority, complete markets ensure that the optimal amount of insurance
is obtained, whereas under Kenens view, a scal authority is still needed to accomplish
redistribution between member countries.
We then investigate whether, once we restrict the scal instruments of governments,
a scal externality arises across countries that necessitates an activist union-wide authority.
That is, we repeat our previous exercise, now with restricted policies, to determine whether
the policies that governments choose to pursue are ine¢ cient from the viewpoint of the
union as a whole. Our key result is that no scal externality arises: even though national
governments are unable to correct all their domestic distortions, they still pursue policies
that are optimal for the union. Thus, even here, we nd that a union-wide scal authority
is unnecessary with complete markets if and only if this authority is concerned solely with
insurance among countries in the union.
We then turn to identifying circumstances under which it is optimal for a union-
wide authority interested solely in insurance to pursue an activist role in scal policy. For
simplicity, we consider a setting in which one group of countries in the union, called the North,
optimally sets traditional scal instruments, that is, payroll and nontraded goods taxes, but
the other group, called the South, is unable (or unwilling) to use nontraded goods taxes. Here
we equip the union-wide authority with portfolio taxes that it can levy on any country in the
union.
The idea is that the well-functioning governments in the North have available a rich set
of policies, the imperfectly functioning governments in the South do not, and the union-wide
authority has available a limited set of instruments. In the world equilibrium, it is optimal
for the union-wide authority to impose portfolio taxes only on the Southern countries. By
doing so, the authority raises the welfare of all countries in the union by partially o¤setting
the distortions that the Southern countries are unable to correct on their own.
This last result may lead one to think that the reason why the union-wide authority
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takes an active role stems from the feature that when countries belong to a monetary union,
they cannot use domestic monetary policy to o¤set country-specic shocks. To show that
this reasoning is incorrect, we consider a scal union with exible exchange rates. Northern
countries optimally set their traditional policy instruments but Southern countries again have
imperfectly functioning governments in that they are unable to levy payroll taxes. The union-
wide authority can levy portfolio taxes on any country in the union. We show that in this
case, the union-wide authority nds it optimal to levy payroll taxes only on the Southern
countries. As before, though, doing so does not correct any macroeconomic externality, rather
it simply helps Southern countries to ameliorate their domestic distortions and, hence, raises
the welfare of all countries in the union.
Throughout we have maintained the assumption that national governments are benev-
olent in that they maximize the welfare of their citizens. Under this assumption, an irrelevance
of the delegation of authority result holds: the equilibrium is unchanged if any of the labor
taxes, nontraded goods taxes, or portfolio taxes are delegated to the national governments
or the union-wide authority. Our last economy shows that if, instead, national governments
pursue their own self interests, then there is typically an incentive for the union as a whole
to delegate powers, such as portfolio taxes, to the union-wide authority rather than to the
national governments.
These latter results provide a deeper perspective on the di¤ering views of Mundell
and Kenen. Overall, Mundell had in mind well-functioning national governments and a
relatively weak union-wide authority concerned only with insurance, whereas Kenen had in
mind relatively poorly functioning national governments and a relatively strong union-wide
authority concerned with redistribution as well as insurance.
We have shown that even when governments have only restricted scal instruments
available, no scal externalities arise. A key feature of our model behind this nding is that
governments have the power to commit to their scal policies once and for all. By doing
so, we abstract from the scal externalities that result from the time inconsistency issues
emerging when national scal policies are set noncooperatively. These issues are the focus of
the work of Chari and Kehoe (2007, 2008) and have recently been revisited by Aguiar et al.
(2013), who draw the same conclusions.
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1. A Currency-Fiscal Union with Incomplete Financial Markets
Here we set up a model of a joint currency-scal union with incomplete international nancial
markets. This model is meant to capture a setting in which international nancial markets
cannot provide adequate insurance between countries against country-specic macroeconomic
shocks. For simplicity, we make the extreme assumption that no international nancial
markets exist.
Throughout, we carefully distinguish between transfers motivated by insurance reasons
and transfers motivated by redistributive reasons. To this end, we are interested in transfers
that respect private ownership, that is, transfers that are optimal when the union-wide scal
authority uses a weight for each country that, at the appropriately dened shadow prices,
does not involve an ex-ante redistribution of wealth from one country to another, say, from
ex-ante richer countries to ex-ante poorer countries.
The timing of the economy involves three stages, which reect the three-tiered struc-
ture of decision-making discussed earlier. At the rst stage, the union-wide authority moves
and sets international transfers. At the second stage, taking as given the decisions of the
union-wide authority, national governments set their national scal policies noncooperatively.
At the third stage, taking as given the polices set in the previous stages, consumers and rms
in each country make their production and consumption decisions. It is convenient to both set
up and solve for equilibrium by working backwards from the end of the period. We therefore
start with the bottom tier.
A. Bottom Tier: Competitive Equilibrium
We start by laying out the economy and dening a competitive equilibrium, given the union-
wide and national policies chosen at higher tiers.
The economy lasts one period, has a continuum of countries i 2 I = [0; 1] that belong
to a currency union, and is adopted from FW. The uncertainty in the economy is represented
by a nite set of states s 2 S in which (s) denotes the probability of state s. This uncertainty
a¤ects preferences and technology. Each consumer in country i has preferences over nontraded
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goods, CiN(s), traded goods, C
i
T (s), and labor, L
i(s), given by
(1)
X
s
(s)U(CiN(s); C
i
T (s); L
i(s); s):
Trade of state-contingent assets in domestic asset markets between consumers in country i
takes place before the state s is realized, subject to the constraint
(2)
X
s
Qi(s)Di(s)  0.
In each state s, a consumer also faces a budget constraint given by
(3) [1 +  iN(s)]P
i
NC
i
N(s) + PT (s)C
i
T (s)
 W i(s)Li(s) + PT (s)

Y iT (s) + T
i(s) + T iI(s)

+ i(s) + [1 +  iD(s)]D
i(s):
All prices are expressed in units of a common currency, say euros. Here Qi(s) is the price at
the beginning of the period for the delivery of one euro in state s, P iN(s) is the country-specic
price of nontraded goods, and PT (s) is the union-wide price of traded goods. Consumers in
country i have endowments of traded goods Y iT (s), elastically supply labor L
i(s) to produce
nontraded goods at a nominal wage of W i(s), and receive nominal prots i(s) from the
ownership of nontraded goods rms. Each consumer takes as given the policies of its national
government, namely the tax rate on the purchases of nontraded goods in state s,  iN(s), the
tax rate on domestic assets  iD(s), and the domestic transfers T
i(s), as well as the policies of
the union-wide scal authority, namely the international transfers T iI(s).
The rst-order conditions for the consumers problem imply that for all states s,
(4) i = (s)
U iT (s)[1 + 
i
D(s)]
PT (s)Qi(s)
;
(5)
U iT (s)
PT (s)
=
U iN(s)
[1 +  iN(s)]P
i
N
;
(6)  U
i
L(s)
U iT (s)
=
W i(s)
PT (s)
;
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where i is the multiplier on the borrowing constraint (2). Here all asset trade is domestic in
that
(7) Di(s) = 0 for all i and s.
In each country i, competitive nontraded nal goods rms buy di¤erentiated varieties
of nontraded goods from intermediate producers and sell them to consumers in country i.
These rms solve
(8) max
fCi;jN (s)g

P iNC
i
N(s) 
Z 1
0
P i;jN C
i;j
N (s)dj

;
subject to CiN(s) =
hR 1
0
Ci;jN (s)
" 1
" dj
i "
" 1
, where " is the elasticity of substitution among
varieties, P iN is the price of the aggregate bundle of goods and P
i;j
N is the price of variety j.
This problem generates a downward-sloping demand for each variety j,
(9) Ci;jN (s) =
 
P i;jN
P iN
! "
CiN(s):
The intermediate goods producers are monopolistically competitive and have sticky prices
in that they set their prices before the realization of the state, s. The producer of variety j
produces goods with technology Ci;jN (s) = A
i(s)Li;j(s) and charges price P i;jN . The prots in
state s of such an intermediate goods producer are
(10) i;j(s) = P i;jN C
i;j
N (s) 
 
1 +  iL

W i(s)Li;j(s);
where  iL is a payroll tax on the labor hired by these rms. The optimal price is set to
maximize the expected value of prots,
(11) max
P i;jN
X
s
Qi(s)

P i;jN  
 
1 +  iL
W i(s)
Ai(s)
 
P i;jN
P iN
! "
CiN(s);
where we have substituted the production technology and the demand function (9) in the
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expression for prots. The resulting optimal price is given by
(12) P i;jN = (1 + 
i
L)
"
"  1
P
sQ
i(s)W
i(s)
Ai(s)
CiN(s)P
sQ
i(s)CiN(s)
;
which is a markup over a weighted average of the marginal costs across states. Notice that
the price of each variety j in country i is the same and equal to the right side of (12). We
denote this common price by P iN .
Consider now the national policies of country i. The policies of country is government
are summarized by i = fi(s)g, where i(s) = ( iL;  iN(s);  iD(s); T i(s)). For each s, the
government budget constraint requires that domestic transfers equal domestic tax revenues,
(13) PT (s)T i(s) =  iLW
i(s)Li(s) +  iN(s)P
i
NC
i
N(s) + 
i
D(s)D
i(s).
The government collects revenues from the payroll tax, the tax on the consumption of non-
traded goods, and the portfolio tax, and rebates these revenues to its consumers in a lump-sum
fashion.
The policies of the union-wide authority are international transfers, T iI = fT iI(s)g.
The budget constraint of this authority species that, for each state s, international transfers
across countries sum to zero in each state s,
(14)
Z
i
T iI(s)di = 0:
Notice that here the union-wide authority transfers resources directly to consumers rather
than to national governments.
Formally, let X = fX ig, with X i = fX i(s)g and X i(s) = (CiT (s); CiN(s); Li(s); Di(s)),
denote the allocations in country i, P = fP ig, with P i = fP i(s)g and P i(s) = (P iN ;W i(s)),
and fQig, with Qi = fQi(s)g, denote the domestic prices in country i, and  = fig denote
national policies. Let PT = fPT (s)g denote the world prices of traded goods, and let TI =
fT iIg, with T iI = fT i(s)g, denote the international transfers for country i.
Given the policies of the union-wide authority, TI , and the national policies , a
competitive equilibrium with incomplete markets consists of world prices PT together with
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allocations, X, and domestic prices, P and fQig, for each country i such that: i) consumer
maximization in each country i holds, ii) prot maximization for both nal goods rms and
intermediate goods rms in each country i holds, iii) the national policy i satises the
government budget constraint, (13), for each country i, iv) the union-wide policies TI satisfy
the budget constraint of the union-wide authority, (14), v) all asset trade is domestic in the
sense that (7) holds, and, nally, vi) the nontraded and traded goods markets clear in that
(15) CiN(s) = A
i(s)Li(s) for all i and s;
(16) CiT (s) = Y
i
T (s) + T
i
I(s) for all i and s.
Note that if we combine the budget constraint of the union-wide authority (14) with
traded goods market clearing, condition (16), we obtain the world market clearing condition
for traded goods,
(17)
Z
i
CiT (s)di =
Z
i
Y iT (s)di for all s:
The following lemma characterizes the set of allocations that can be implemented in
such an equilibrium.
Lemma 1. The allocations in a competitive equilibrium with incomplete markets sat-
isfy the nontraded and traded goods market clearing, namely, (15) and (16). Moreover, given
any allocations that satisfy these constraints, we can construct prices and policies for each
country that, together with the given allocations, constitute an equilibrium with incomplete
markets.
Proof. For necessity, by denition of an equilibrium, the allocations satisfy nontraded
and traded goods market clearing. For su¢ ciency, given some allocations, we construct prices,
policies, and asset holdings as follows. Clearly, there is one degree of nominal indeterminacy
in the construction of nominal good prices, which we resolve by setting PT (s0) = 1 for some
particular state s0. To see there is also some indeterminacy in the setting of nontraded taxes,
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 iN(s), note that (5) implies
(18)
U iT (s)=U
i
N(s)
U iT (s0)=U
i
N(s0)
=
PT (s)[1 + 
i
N(s0)]
1 +  iN(s)
:
We uniquely pin down PT (s) by picking a country, say i = 0, and setting  0N(s) = 0 for all s.
Doing so gives
(19) PT (s) =
U0T (s)=U
0
N(s)
U0T (s0)=U
0
N(s0)
:
Given PT (s), however, (18) makes clear that for each country i 6= 0, there is still one degree
of indeterminacy in nontraded taxes. To resolve this indeterminacy, we pick a state, say s0,
and set  iN(s0) = 0 for all i. Then, using PT (s0) = 1 and 
i
N(s0) = 0 for all i; from (5) we
obtain
(20) P iN =
U iN(s0)
U iT (s0)
:
Then, substituting (19) into (18) and using  iN(s0) = 0 gives that the tax on nontraded goods
for a country i 6= 0 is given by
(21) 1 +  iN(s) =
U iT (s0)=U
i
N(s0)
U iT (s)=U
i
N(s)
PT (s);
and from (6) wages are given by
W i(s) =  U
i
L(s)
U iT (s)
PT (s);
where PT (s) is given by (19).
There is also one degree of nominal indeterminacy in asset prices. We resolve this
indeterminacy by setting Qi(s0) = 1. There is clearly also a joint indeterminacy in Qi(s) and
 iD(s). We resolve it by letting Q
i(s) = Q(s) for all i and s, setting  0D(s) = 0 for all s, and
 iD(s0) = 0 for all i 6= 0. Now, using these normalizations, we can divide (4) for country 0
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evaluated at state s by this same equation for country 0 evaluated at state s0 to obtain
(22) Q(s) =
1
PT (s)
(s)U0T (s)
(s0)U0T (s0)
;
where PT (s) is given by (19). Now, for i 6= 0, dividing (4) for states s and s0 and then using
our normalizations and the expression for Q(s) in (4) gives that portfolio taxes are given by
(23) 1 +  iD(s) =
U iT (s0)
U iT (s)
U0T (s)
U0T (s0)
:
Given P iN , W
i(s), and Qi(s), the payroll tax  iL is set so that (12) holds. Domestic transfers
are given from the government budget constraint, whereas international transfers are given
by
(24) T iI(s) = PT (s)

CiT (s)  Y iT (s)

:
To see that such transfers are consistent with the consumer and government budget con-
straints, combine these budget constraints and substitute for prots from (10) with Di(s) = 0
to obtain (24). To see that such transfers are consistent with the union-wide constraint on
international transfers, integrate (24) over countries and use world market clearing in traded
goods, (17), to obtain (14). Q:E:D:
Note that the competitive equilibrium is dened for each possible setting of union-
wide and national policies, (TI ; ). As will become clear below, in what follows it is best to
think of the competitive equilibrium as the continuation equilibrium of the noncooperative
equilibrium of the second stage among national governments for given union-wide policies.
That is, we can think of this equilibrium as specifying allocation functions, X(TI ; ), world
price functions, PT (TI ; ), and domestic price functions, P (TI ; ) and fQi(TI ; )g, that vary
with union-wide and national policies, (TI ; ). Noncooperative national governments will use
these maps to forecast how outcomes change as they vary their national policies.
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B. Middle Tier: Noncooperative Equilibrium between National Authorities
Consider now the middle tier. Taking as given the decisions of the union-wide scal au-
thority, national governments set their policies noncooperatively. The policy for country is
government, i = fi(s)g, with i(s) = ( iL;  iN(s);  iD(s); T i(s)), consists of taxes on labor,
the consumption of traded goods and asset holdings, and of transfers. The strategy of country
is government, i(TI), depends on the history it faces which, in this three-tiered structure,
is simply the union-wide transfers, TI , chosen at the top tier.
For any given set of union-wide policies, TI = fT iIg, a noncooperative equilibrium of the
incomplete market economy consists of strategies (TI) = fi(TI)g for national governments,
together with world price functions, PT (TI ; ), and allocations and domestic price functions
for each country, fX i(TI ; ); P i(TI ; ); Qi(TI ; )g where  = fig, such that: i) given the
union-wide policies TI and the national policies of every other country j 6= i, denoted  i(TI),
the national policy of any country i, i = i(TI), maximizes the welfare of country is
consumers, and ii) for every (TI ; ), the world price functions, the allocations functions, and
the domestic price functions form a competitive equilibrium with incomplete markets.
The equilibrium outcomes associated with these strategies are T^I , (T^I),PT (T^I ; (T^I)),
and fX i(T^I ; (T^I)); P i(T^I ; (T^I)); Qi(T^I ; (T^I))g, where T^I is the optimal policy of the union-
wide authority. Moreover, the noncooperative equilibrium should be thought of as simply the
continuation of the world equilibrium for a given set of union-wide policies.
Consider the notion of perfection built into this noncooperative equilibrium denition.
As the government of country i contemplates alternative policies, ~i, it anticipates that the
resulting prices and allocations, PT (TI ; ~) and fX i(TI ; ~); P i(TI ; ~); Qi(TI ; ~)g, with ~ =
(~i;  i(TI)), form a competitive equilibrium. Given the structure of the world economy, as
the government of country i changes its policies, consumers and rms in country i change
their production and consumption decisions, domestic prices change but, because country
i is small in the world economy, all other countries allocations and domestic prices are
unchanged. That is, since PT (TI ; ~) with ~ = (~i;  i(TI)) is invariant to ~i, given the
union-wide transfers TI , the government of country i just faces a given price function, say
PT = PT (TI ;  i(TI)).
We now show how this feature of equilibrium simplies the problem of country is
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government. Using logic standard in the primal approach to optimal policy, we can think of
national governments as choosing policies, allocations, and domestic prices for country is con-
sumers and rms, subject to the conditions of the competitive equilibrium of the third stage.
Formally, the problem of the government of country is problem can be written as follows:
taking as given international transfers, T iI , and traded goods prices, PT = PT (TI ;  i(TI)),
choose country is allocations, prices, and policies to solve
(25) ~V i(T iI) = max
Xi;P i;Qi;i
X
s
(s)U i(CiN(s); C
i
T (s); L
i(s); s);
subject to consumer and rm rst-order conditions in country i, the consumer and government
budget constraints in country i, and country is market clearing conditions in nontraded (15)
and traded goods (16), where in the consumer and government budget constraints PT =
PT (TI ;  i(TI)).1
We claim that the best-response problem of a noncooperative government can be
reduced to a simpler form, that is,
(26) V i(T iI) = maxfCiN (s);CiT (s);Li(s)g
X
s
(s)U i(CiN(s); C
i
T (s); L
i(s); s);
subject to nontraded goods market clearing
(27) CiN(s)  Ai(s)Li(s) for all s;
and a country-wide budget constraint
(28) CiT (s)  Y iT (s) + T iI(s) for all s:
Note that since there are no international nancial markets. the government of country i
realizes that there is no choice in the consumption of traded goods: the consumers in country
i simply consume their endowment plus international transfers of traded goods.
1Here, and throughout the paper, we follow the primal approach in assuming that if there are multiple
equilibria associated with its policies, a government can select the best one.
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Lemma 2. In an economy with incomplete markets, for any international transfers TI
and strategies of other governments,  i(TI), the best response of the government of country
i gives rise to allocations that solve (26).
Proof . The constraints facing the government of country i are summarized by the
asset constraint, (2), the consumer budget constraint, (3), the rst-order conditions for con-
sumers, (4), (5), and (6), the market clearing for domestic assets, (7), the rst-order condition
for nontraded goods rms, (12), the government budget constraint, (13), and the nontraded
and traded goods market clearing conditions, (15) and (16).
We rst show that an allocation that is feasible for the government must satisfy (27)
and (28) for country i. First, (15) is the same as (27), since (27) holds as an equality.
Second, to see how the constraint (28) arises, substitute in the consumer budget constraint
the expression for prots, i(s) = P iNC
i
N(s) (1 +  iL)W i(s)Li(s), the expression for domestic
transfers, T i(s), using the government budget constraint, (13), and Di(s) = 0 from (7). After
cancelling terms, we obtain PT (s)CiT (s)  PT (s) [Y iT (s) + T iI(s)], which is equivalent to (28).
Now, given any allocations that satisfy (27) and (28), we can construct national policies and
national prices so that the rest of the constraints are satised, by following the same steps as
in Lemma 1. Q:E:D:
To develop some intuition for why a noncooperative governments problem can be
reduced to a country-specic Ramsey-type problem, note that each country i is small and,
hence, the domestic allocations, prices, and policies chosen by the government of this country
cannot have an impact on world prices. Moreover, the policy choices of the countries in the
rest of the union only a¤ect a given country indirectly through traded goods prices, which
are set competitively.
Lemma 2 makes it clear that, given the vector of international transfers for each coun-
try, fT iIg, and world prices, PT , the utility of country i only depends on the international
transfers to country i. Thus, Lemma 2 establishes the precise sense in which no scal exter-
nalities across countries exist.
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C. Top Tier: World Equilibrium
The union-wide authority chooses international transfers to maximize a weighted sum of
consumersutility in each country, that is, to solve
(29) max
fT iIg
Z
i
iV (T iI)di
subject to
(30)
Z
i
T iI(s)di = 0 for all s:
Notice that the union-wide authority predicts that as it changes its transfers, the noncooper-
ative governments will alter their policies, and thus the associated prices and allocations, so
that the solution to (26) arises as a noncooperative equilibrium. In particular, for every set of
transfers ~TI it contemplates, the union-wide authority predicts that the national governments
will choose policies ( ~TI) consistent with a noncooperative equilibrium.
A world equilibrium with incomplete markets is a set of union-wide transfers, TI , strate-
gies for national governments, together with world price functions, and allocations and do-
mestic price functions for each country, such that: i) the union-wide transfers, TI , are optimal
for the union-wide authority, and ii) the strategies for national governments, together with
the world price functions, allocation functions, and domestic price functions for each country,
form a noncooperative equilibrium.
This notion also has a type of perfection built into it: as the union-wide authority
contemplates alternative transfers, ~TI , it understands that national governments will best
respond to each such set of transfers using ( ~TI) and the resulting competitive allocations
and prices will be those consistent with ~TI and ( ~TI).
Using standard primal logic, we can think of the union-wide authority as choosing
all policies, allocations, and prices subject to two sets of conditions.2 The rst set are all
the rst-order conditions of consumers and rms, the budget constraints of consumers and
2Here, as is standard in the primal approach, if there are multiple continuation equilibria for a given set
of policies, we implicitly let both the union-wide authority and the national governments select the best such
equilibrium.
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governments, and the market clearing conditions that dene the competitive equilibrium.
The second set are the optimality conditions for the policies of each governments best-
response problem. Notice that since the consumption of traded goods is pinned down by the
endowment and international transfers, the only optimality conditions from the governments
best-response problem are for nontraded goods and labor. Substituting the constraints (27)
and (28), holding as equalities, into the objective function (26), these rst-order conditions
for nontraded goods and labor reduce to
(31) U iN(s) + A
i(s)U iL(s) = 0.
Notice also that if allocations satisfy (28) and the union-wide authority can choose interna-
tional transfers that satisfy (30), then the union-wide authority is only constrained by the
world resource constraint for traded goods, (17).
Now consider a relaxed version of the authoritys problem, where we substitute out
all the policies and drop the rst-order condition (31), which arises from (26). This relaxed
problem, referred to as the union-wide problem, is
(32) max
fCiN (s);CiT (s);Li(s)g
Z
i
i
"X
s
(s)U i(CiN(s); C
i
T (s); L
i(s); s)
#
di
subject to
(33) CiN(s)  Ai(s)Li(s) for all s;
(34)
Z
i
CiT (s)di 
Z
i
Y iT (s)di for all s:
We claim that it is immediate that the solution to this relaxed problem has rst-order condi-
tions that are consistent with the dropped rst-order condition (31) of the governments best
response problem. Hence, the solution to the relaxed problem coincides with the solution to
the original problem. We summarize this discussion as follows.
Lemma 3. The allocations in the world equilibrium with incomplete markets solve the
union-wide problem (32).
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2. A Currency-Fiscal Union with Complete Financial Markets
Here we consider a joint currency-scal union with complete international nancial markets.
We think of this complete market setting as capturing the idea that in the modern era of
international nancial markets, countries can access these markets to obtain cross-country
insurance. We again work backwards from the end of the period, starting from the competitive
equilibrium.
A. Bottom Tier: Competitive Equilibrium
We begin with a denition of a competitive equilibrium. Given the national policies
c and the policies of the union-wide authority, T cI , a competitive equilibrium with complete
markets consists of world prices, P cT and Q
c, together with allocations, fX i;cg, and domestic
prices, fP i;cg, for each country i such that: i) consumer maximization in each country i holds,
ii) prot maximization for nal goods rms and intermediate goods rms in each country i
holds, iii) the national policy i;c satises the government budget constraint of each country i,
(13), iv) the union-wide policies T cI satisfy the budget constraint of the union-wide authority,
(14), v) the world asset market clears in that
(35)
Z
i
Dci (s)di = 0 for all s;
and, nally, vi) the nontraded and traded goods markets clear in that
Ci;cN (s) = A
i(s)Li;c(s) for all i and s;
Z
i
Ci;cT (s)di =
Z
i
Y iT (s)di for all s.
Note that with complete markets, there is now one world asset market rather than separate
domestic asset markets. Given the presence of complete markets, any vector of international
transfers, T iI(s), with the same present value is equivalent from the perspective of both the
consumers and the government of country i. Thus, in dening a world equilibrium, there will
be an indeterminacy in international transfers because under complete markets, any two sets
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of transfers, T iI(s) and T^
i
I(s), are equivalent if they satisfy
X
s
Q(s)PT (s)T
i
I(s) =
X
s
Q(s)PT (s)T^
i
I(s);
for given Q(s) and PT (s). We resolve this indeterminacy by representing international trans-
fers as a constant transfer across states, T i;cI , such that T
i;c
I (s) = T
i;c
I for all s. Here, as
earlier, we can think of equilibrium as specifying allocation functions, Xc(T cI ; 
c), world price
functions, P cT (T
c
I ; 
c) and Qc(T cI ; 
c), and domestic price functions, P c(T cI ; 
c), that vary with
union-wide and national policies, (T cI ; 
c). The proof of the following lemma is nearly identical
to that of Lemma 1 and is left to the reader.
Lemma 4. The allocations in a competitive equilibrium with complete markets satisfy
the nontraded and traded goods market clearing, namely, (15) and (16). Moreover, given
any allocations that satisfy these constraints, we can construct prices, policies, and asset
holdings for each country that, together with the given allocations, constitute an equilibrium
with complete markets.
B. Middle Tier: Noncooperative Equilibrium between National Authorities
Consider now the middle tier. As before, taking as given the decisions of the union-wide
authority, national governments set their policies noncooperatively.
For any given set of union-wide policies, T cI = fT i;cI g, a noncooperative equilibrium of
the complete market economy consists of strategies c(T cI ) = fi;c(T cI )g for national govern-
ments, together with world price functions, P cT (T
c
I ; 
c) and Qc(T cI ; 
c), and allocations and
domestic price functions for each country, fX i;c(T cI ; c); P i;c(T cI ; c)g where c = fi;cg, such
that: i) given the union-wide policies T cI and the national policies of every other country
j 6= i, denoted c i(T cI ), the national policy of any country i, i;c = i;c(TI), maximizes the
welfare of country is consumers, and ii) for every (T cI ; 
c), the world price functions, the
allocation functions, and the domestic price functions form a competitive equilibrium with
complete markets.
Using similar logic to the one used before, the best-response of a noncooperative
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government can be reduced to a simpler form, that is,
(36) V i(T i;cI ) = maxfCiN (s);CiT (s);Li(s)g
X
s
(s)U i(CiN(s); C
i
T (s); L
i(s); s);
subject to nontraded goods market clearing
(37) CiN(s)  Ai(s)Li(s) for all s;
and a country-wide budget constraint
(38)
X
s
Qc(s)P cT (s)C
i
T (s) 
X
s
Qc(s)P cT (s)

Y iT (s) + T
i;c
I

;
where P cT = P
c
T (T
c
I ;  i(T
c
I )) and Q
c = Qc(T cI ;  i(T
c
I )). Here, as earlier, we use the property
that the world prices do not vary with the policies of country i.
Lemma 5. In an economy with complete markets, for any international transfers T cI
and strategies of other governments,  i(T cI ), the best response of the government of country
i gives rise to allocations that solve (36).
Proof . The proof follows closely that of Lemma 2 with a few exceptions. The con-
straints facing the government of country i are the same as in Lemma 2 except that the asset
market clearing condition (7) is replaced by (35). To see that an allocation that is feasible for
the government must satisfy the country-wide budget constraint (38), multiply the consumer
budget constraint for each s by the world asset price Qc(s), sum across states, then perform
the same substitutions as in Lemma 2 to arrive at (38).
Now, given any allocations that satisfy (37) and (38), we can construct national policies
and national prices so that the rest of the constraints are satised. Here country i takes as
given the world prices, Qc(s) and P cT (s). Given these prices we proceed as in Lemma 2, by
setting the portfolio tax to zero in only one state, that is,  iD(s0) = 0 so that (4) becomes
(39) 1 +  iD(s) =
U iT (s0)
U iT (s)
Qc(s)P cT (s)
Qc(s0)P cT (s0)
and let (39) determine  iD(s). (In contrast to Lemma 1, where we also constructed world
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prices, here we only characterize the best response of a government given these prices.) We
set  iN(s), P
i;c
N , W
i(s),  iL, and T
i;c(s) as in Lemma 2. Q:E:D:
C. Top Tier: World Equilibrium
A world equilibrium with complete markets is a set of union-wide transfers, T cI , strategies
for national governments, together with world price functions, and allocation and domestic
price functions for each country, such that: i) the union-wide transfers, T cI , are optimal for
the union-wide authority, and ii) the strategies for national governments, together with the
world price functions, allocation functions, and domestic price functions for each country,
form a noncooperative equilibrium.
As before, using standard primal logic, the union-wide authority can be thought of as
choosing all the policies, allocations, and prices subject to two sets of conditions. The rst set
are all the rst-order conditions of consumers and rms, the budget constraints of consumers
and national governments, and the market clearing conditions that dene the competitive
equilibrium of the third stage. The second set of conditions are the optimality conditions for
policies for each governments best-response problem. Now consider a relaxed version of this
authoritys problem, where we substituted out all the policies and dropped the rst-order
conditions of national governments that arise from the rewritten governments problem (36).
This relaxed problem has the form
(40) max
fCiN (s);CiT (s);Li(s)g
Z
i
i
"X
s
(s)U i(CiN(s); C
i
T (s); L
i(s); s)
#
di
subject to
CiN(s)  Ai(s)Li(s) and
Z
i
CiT (s)di 
Z
i
Y iT (s)di, for all s:
Clearly, the solution to the relaxed problem has rst-order conditions that are consistent with
the rst-order conditions of each governments best response problem (36). Thus, the solution
to the relaxed problem is a solution to the original problem. In sum, we have established the
following result.
Lemma 6. The allocations in the world equilibrium with complete markets solve the
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union-wide problem (40).
It is worth noting that in the world equilibrium with complete markets that supports
these allocations, portfolio taxes are not used. To see why, note that the solution to the
union-wide problem implies complete risk sharing in that
(41) iU iT (s) = 
0U0T (s) for all i and s.
Dividing this condition by its analog in state s0 gives that allocations with complete risk
sharing satisfy
(42)
U iT (s)
U iT (s0)
=
U0T (s)
U0T (s0)
for all i and s.
Now, consider the decentralized equilibrium: with complete international nancial markets,
which imply Qi(s) = Q(s) for all i, the rst-order condition (4) implies that
(43)
[1 +  iD(s)](s)U
i
T (s)
[1 +  iD(s0)](s0)U
i
T (s0)
=
[1 +  0D(s)](s)U
0
T (s)
[1 +  0D(s0)](s0)U
0
T (s0)
= Qc(s)P cT (s);
where we have used the normalizations that Qc(s0) = P cT (s0) = 1. Clearly, the allocations
that satisfy (42) can be supported as competitive allocations with  iD(s) = 0 for all i and s.
In this sense, portfolio taxes are redundant given nontraded goods taxes.
Note that in the benchmark economy, we allowed national governments to have a
payroll tax, a nontraded goods tax, and a portfolio tax. We note that if instead we endowed
governments only with a payroll tax and a nontraded goods tax, then the allocations that
solve the best response problem for noncooperative governments and the union-wide problem
would be the same. To understand this result, note that with  iD(s) = 0 for all i and s,
dividing the rst-order condition in a given country i for state s by the corresponding one
for state s0 gives that allocations must satisfy the extra constraint
(44)
(s)U iT (s)
(s0)U iT (s0)
= PT (s)Q(s) for all s 6= s0:
This constraint would then need to be added to the best-response problem, (36). To see that
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this extra constraint is superuous, consider a relaxed version of this problem without the
constraint (44). The rst-order conditions to the relaxed problem then imply (44), so the
solution to the relaxed problem is feasible for the original problem with the constraint and
hence solves it. It is then immediate that the union-wide problem is unchanged. Now when
there are incomplete markets, the portfolio taxes are irrelevant. Hence, our results would be
unchanged.
3. Do Financial Markets Obviate the Need for a Fiscal Union?
We have argued that the key di¤erence betweenMundells and Kenens views of a union
is that Mundell envisions a union in which international transfers are motivated solely by
insurance reasons, whereas Kenen imagines a union in which these transfers are motivated by
redistributive reasons as well. To formalize these di¤erent views, we need to distinguish clearly
a unions goal of providing insurance to member countries from its goal of redistributing ex-
ante wealth.
Given our setup with self-interested consumers and governments, acting on behalf of
their own consumers, obviously no government will willingly give away ex-ante wealth. Hence,
regardless of how sophisticated international nancial markets are, if the goal of a union is
to redistribute ex-ante wealth, a union-wide authority is needed to extract ex-ante resources
from one group of countries and redistribute them to another. That is, under Kenens view,
an activist union-wide authority is necessary to implement such redistribution.
We argue that the key di¤erence between Mundells and Kenens views of a union
amounts to di¤erent specications of the Pareto weights used by the union-wide authority
when deciding on international transfers. Specically, note that for an arbitrary set of welfare
weights,  =

i
	
, a union-wide authority both provides insurance and redistributes ex-ante
wealth. To focus on insurance only, we proceed as follows. For any given set of weights,
we construct our decentralization of the allocations from the union-wide problem in the
incomplete market equilibrium, (32), as in Lemma 1, with articial pricesQ(s;) and PT (s;)
and associated consumption levels CiT (s;). The international transfers that decentralize this
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problem are dened by
(45) T iI(; s) = Y
i
T (s)  CiT (s;);
that is, T iI(; s) are the transfers in state s given to each consumer in country i when the
union-wide authority uses the Pareto weights . Under the decentralization of this problem,
these transfers have an ex-ante value of
(46) W iI() =
X
s
Q(s;)PT (s;)T
i
I(; s):
We say that the weights  involve no ex-ante transfer of wealth between countries if
(47) W iI() = 0 for all i 2 I:
We will say that a union-wide scal authority is concerned solely with insurance if its objective
function has weights that involve no ex-ante transfer of wealth between countries, and that
it has redistributive motives otherwise.
In short, according to Mundells view, in the incomplete markets era, the union-wide
authority has weights that satisfy (47). Given these weights, we then address Mundells
question: In the modern era of complete markets, is there any role for an activist union-wide
policy of transfers? More precisely, we say that the union-wide scal authority is unnecessary
with complete markets if the allocations in the world equilibrium in which this authority
implements international transfers coincide with those in which all international transfers
are restricted to zero. That is, letting T^ i;cI () denote the optimal transfers under complete
markets, the union-wide authority is unnecessary if T^ i;cI () = 0 for all i. The following is our
rst main proposition.
Proposition 1. (Complete Markets Obviate the Need for a Fiscal Union) A union-
wide scal authority is unnecessary with complete markets if and only if this authority is
concerned solely with insurance.
Proof . The problem of the union-wide authority with incomplete markets reduces to
the one in (40). Let CiT (s;) and Q(s;) solve this problem. The rst-order conditions imply
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perfect risk-sharing in that
(48) iU iT (s;) = 
0U0T (s;) for all i and s;
which yields
(49)
U iT (s;)
U iT (s0;)
=
U0T (s;)
U0T (s0;)
for all i and s:
Using the decentralization in Lemma 1, we obtain
(50) PT (s;) =
U0T (s;)=U
0
N(s;)
U0T (s0;)=U
0
N(s0;)
and Q(s;) =
1
PT (s;)
(s)U iT (s;)
(s0)U iT (s0;)
;
where (49) and (50) imply that Q(s;) does not vary with the country i. The transfers are
(51) T iI(s;) = Y
i
T (s)  CiT (s;);
that is, T iI(s;) are the transfers in state s given to each consumer in country i when the
union-wide authority uses the Pareto weights . These transfers involve no ex-ante transfer
of wealth between countries if
(52) W iI() =
X
s
Q(s;)PT (s;)T
i
I(s;) = 0 for all i:
Now consider the problem of the union-wide authority with complete markets. As we
have argued, that problem also reduces to (40) and thus are also equal to CiT (s;) above.
We can decentralize these allocations as we did in Lemma 4. Clearly, the prices Qc(s;)
and P cT (s;) that decentralize these allocations as a complete market equilibrium equal the
prices Q(s;) and PT (s;) that decentralize it as an incomplete market equilibrium. The
state-uncontingent transfers T c;iI () that decentralize this outcome under complete markets
are related to the state contingent transfers T iI(s;) that decentralize this outcome under
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incomplete markets by
(53) T c;i()
X
s
Q(s;)PT (s;) =
X
s
Q(s;)PT (s;)T
i
I(s;):
Thus, for the weights  that involve no ex ante transfer of wealth under incomplete markets,
namely those that satisfy (46), the complete market transfers necessarily satisfy
(54) T c;i() = 0 for all i:
Thus, (54) establishes that a union-wide scal authority is unnecessary with complete markets
if and only if this authority is concerned solely with insurance. Q:E:D:
4. Do Restrictions on Instruments Generate Fiscal Externalities?
So far we have considered economies in which national governments have available rich enough
scal instruments so that they can correct private distortions and achieve allocations in which
the distortions associated with monopoly power, sticky prices, and a xed exchange rate can
be eliminated by a suitable choice of policies. Thus, with such instruments and complete
markets, each national government can maximize its residents welfare subject only to a
country-wide budget constraint and the nontraded goods resource constraint.
Here we consider economies in which national governments have a restricted set of scal
instruments available so that they cannot eliminate all private distortions. The question we
address is the following: Does restricting the set of scal instruments of national governments
introduce a scal externality across countries? That is, with restricted instruments, is a
union-wide scal authority necessary to achieve the relevant constrained e¢ cient outcomes?
Our answer is no: even with restricted instruments, no scal externality arises and, thus, a
union-wide scal authority is unnecessary if the authority is concerned solely with insurance.
A. Restrictions on the Policy Instruments
Here we restrict governments to have no domestic policy instrument that a¤ects the
relative prices of traded and nontraded goods, that is, we make the restricted policy assump-
27
tion that
(55)  iN(s) = 0 for all i and s.
We again proceed by working backwards from the end of the period. To characterize the
set of allocations that can be implemented by a suitable choice of policy, consider the rst-
order conditions of consumers in (4)(6) and the intermediate goods rms in (12) under the
restricted policy assumption. We claim that in addition to the resource constraints, these
allocations must satisfy some additional constraints that we refer to as incomplete tax system
constraints. To see how these constraints arise, note that with  iN(s) restricted to zero and
the normalization that PT (s0) = 1, the rst-order condition (5) implies
(56) PT (s) =
U iT (s)=U
i
N(s)
U iT (s0)=U
i
N(s0)
;
where the right-most term does not vary across countries. Thus, the left side of (56) must be
the same across all countries for any state s. Letting Ri(s)  U iT (s)=U iN(s), we can compactly
express these constraints relative to some particular country, say i = 0, as
(57)
Ri(s)
Ri(s0)
=
R0(s)
R0(s0)
for all i and s:
Hence, for each country i 6= 0, there is one constraint per state s 6= s0. Here we discuss how
these incomplete tax constraints change the analysis in the incomplete and complete market
economies.
B. Incomplete Markets with Restricted Policy
We again proceed with each tier. A competitive equilibrium with incomplete markets
and restricted policies is dened analogously to that of the our economy with unrestricted
instruments. The key lemma characterizing the competitive equilibrium is the analog of
Lemma 1.
Lemma 7. With restricted policies, the allocations in a competitive equilibrium with
incomplete markets satisfy the nontraded and traded goods market clearing conditions, namely,
28
(15) and (16), and the incomplete tax constraints, (57). Moreover, given any allocations that
satisfy these constraints, we can construct prices and policies for each country that, together
with the given allocations, constitute an equilibrium with incomplete markets.
Proof. For necessity, by denition of an equilibrium, the allocations satisfy nontraded
and traded goods market clearing. To see that they must also satisfy the incomplete tax
constraints, divide each term in (5) for some state s by its counterpart in state s0, imposing
 iN(s) = 
i
N(s
0) = 0 to get
(58)
Ri(s)
Ri(s0)
=
PT (s)
PT (s0)
:
To see that (58) implies (57), pick state s0 to be state s0 and divide (58) for country i by the
same constraint for country 0. This yields (57). For su¢ ciency, the construction follows the
same steps as in Lemma 1. Q:E:D:
Given the policies of the union-wide authority, TI = fT iIg, a noncooperative equilibrium
of the incomplete market economy consists of strategies (TI) = fi(TI)g for national gov-
ernments, together with world price functions, PT (TI ; ), and allocation and domestic price
functions for each country, fX i(TI ; ); P i(TI ; ); Qi(TI ; )g, such that: i) given the union-
wide policies TI and the national policies of every other country j 6= i, denoted  i(TI), the
national policy of any country i, i = i(TI), maximizes the welfare of country is consumers,
and ii) for every (TI ; ), the world price functions, the allocations functions, and the domes-
tic price functions form a competitive equilibrium with incomplete markets and restricted
policies.
We claim that it is immediate from Lemma 7 and the denition of the noncooperative
equilibrium that the best response of country is government has allocations that solve
(59) Vi(T iI) = maxfCiT (s);Li(s)g
X
s
(s)U i(Ai(s)Li(s); CiT (s); L
i(s); s);
subject to a country-wide budget constraints
(60) CiT (s)  Y iT (s) + T iI(s) for all s
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and the incomplete market constraint
(61) Ri(s) = PT (s)Ri(s0) for s 6= s0;
with PT (s0) = 1 where PT = PT (TI ;  i(TI)). The reason governmentsbest responses solve
this problem is that, taking as given the union-wide policies T iI and the strategies  i(TI)
of other governments, the government of country i can manipulate its national policies to
implement any allocation that satises (60) and (61). Notice that with restricted instruments,
the constraints (61) imply that we can no longer reduce this best response problem to one in
which all the traded goods prices have been substituted out as we did earlier with unrestricted
instruments. The presence of these extra constraints, (61), clearly introduces additional
distortions into this problem relative to the one with an unrestricted tax system. Here, the
incomplete tax system constraints typically bind when countries face di¤erent shocks. Finally,
the analog of Lemma 3 is immediate.
Lemma 8. The allocations in the world equilibrium with incomplete markets solve
the union-wide problem of maximizing (32), subject to the resource constraint for nontraded
goods, the world resource constraint for traded goods, and the incomplete tax constraints in
(57).
For any given set of weights  =

i
	
, we construct our decentralization of the solution
to the union-wide problem for the incomplete market economy with restricted instruments
as in Lemma 1, with articial prices Qi(s;) and associated consumption levels CiT (s;).
The international transfers that decentralize this problem satisfy (45). The denitions of a
union-wide authority being concerned solely with insurance, having redistributive motives,
and being unnecessary with complete markets are the natural analogs of those introduced
earlier for the economy with no restrictions on instruments.
C. Complete Markets with Restricted Policy
The analysis here is an immediate extension of our analysis above. The key lemma for
the competitive equilibrium is the analog of Lemma 7. For simplicity, we drop the superscript
c whenever unambiguous.
Lemma 9. With restricted instruments, the allocations in a competitive equilibrium
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with complete markets satisfy the nontraded and traded goods market clearing conditions,
namely (15) and (16), and the incomplete tax constraints (57). Moreover, given any alloca-
tions that satisfy these constraints, we can construct prices, policies, and asset holdings that,
together with the given allocations, constitute an equilibrium with complete markets.
The proof of Lemma 8 is essentially identical to that of Lemma 5. Given the world
prices PT and Q and the international transfers T
i;c
I , the problem of the noncooperative
government of country i is to choose allocations to maximize the welfare of country i, where
(62) max
fCiT (s);Li(s)g
X
s
(s)U i(Ai(s)Li(s); CiT (s); L
i(s); s)
subject to
(63)
X
s
Q(s)PT (s)C
i
T (s) 
X
s
Q(s)PT (s)

Y iT (s) + T
i;c
I

;
(64) Ri(s) = PT (s)Ri(s0) all s 6= s0;
where PT and Q are dened as functions of (TI ;  i(TI)) and are part of a competitive
equilibrium with complete markets and restricted policies. The second main result of the
paper is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. (Even with Restricted Instruments, Complete Markets Obviate the
Need for a Fiscal Union) In an economy with restricted instruments, a union-wide scal
authority is unnecessary with complete markets if and only if this authority is concerned
solely with insurance.
Proof . The proof is essentially identical to that of Proposition 1. The union-wide
authoritys problems under incomplete and complete markets reduce to the same planning
problem, namely, maximize (29) subject to the resource constraints for nontraded goods, (27),
the world resource constraints for traded goods, (34), and the incomplete tax constraints,
(57). Using the decentralizations of Lemmas 7 and 8, if the weights that decentralize the
incomplete market allocations have international transfers T iI(s;) that involve no ex-ante
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transfer of wealth in that
X
s
Q(s;)PT (s;)T
i
I(s;) = 0;
then clearly for those same weights, the complete market transfers, T i;c(), that decentralize
these same outcomes necessarily satisfy
T c;i()
X
s
Q(s;)PT (s;) = 0 for all i;
so that T c;i() = 0 for all i. Q:E:D:
5. When is There a Role for an Activist Union-Wide Authority?
We have shown that for the economies considered, there is no role for an activist union-
wide authority when that authority is concerned solely with insurance. Here we determine
conditions under which there might be a role for such an authority.
Our results so far depend on the idea that the union-wide authority has no instruments,
except for international transfers, that national governments do not have available and that
the national government of each country is benevolent, in that it chooses policies to maximize
the welfare of its residents. It is primarily the combination of these two assumptions, along
with the assumption that policy-makers have commitment, and that each country is small
in the world in the relevant sense, which allows us to establish this result. If we drop any of
these assumptions, there may be a role for a union-wide authority, even one concerned solely
with insurance.
We prove this point through three examples. Our rst example shows that if some
countries are constrained in their choice of instruments, there is a role for an active union-
wide authority to levy portfolio taxes. Our second example shows that even when countries
have exible exchange rates, if national governments face constraints on their policies, then
the union-wide authority typically has an incentive to intervene and impose portfolio taxes.
Finally, our last example shows that if national governments do not maximize the welfare
of their citizens but rather pursue their own self interests, then there is an incentive for the
union as a whole to delegate the power to set portfolio taxes to the union-wide authority
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rather than to the national governments.
A. Portfolio Taxes To Help Policy-Constrained Countries in a Union
Suppose that all countries in one group of the union, N or the North, have access to labor
taxes, nontraded goods taxes and lump-sum transfers, f iL;  iN(s); T i(s)g for i 2 N , but that
countries in another group, S or the South, have access to only labor taxes and lump sum
taxes, f iL; T i(s)g for i 2 S. Suppose, moreover, that the union-wide authority, rather than
national governments, can levy taxes on the portfolios of all countries in the union, f iD(s)g
for all i, and when it levies such taxes on a country, it rebates the proceeds to that country.
Clearly, the restriction on instruments for the Southern countries add incomplete tax
constraints of the form
(65)
Ri(s)
Ri(s0)
=
R0(s)
R0(s0)
for all i 2 S and s;
where country 0 is a Southern country. Now, given that the union-wide authority can levy
portfolio taxes f iD(s)g on any country, it is easy to show that the problem of the union-wide
authority becomes
(66) max
fCiT (s);Li(s)g
Z
i
i
"X
s
(s)U i(Ai(s)Li(s); CiT (s); L
i(s); s)
#
di;
subject to the incomplete tax constraints for the Southern countries (65) and the world
resource constraint for traded goods. Now consider two pairs of countries, countries i; j 2 N
and k; l 2 S. The rst-order conditions imply that, for all s
(67) iU iT (s) = 
jU jT (s) = 
kUkT (s) + 
k(s) = lU lT (s) + 
l(s);
where for c = k; l, c 6= 0, and s 6= s0,
(68) c(s) = c [Ac(s)U cN(s) + U
c
L(s)]
@Rc(s)=@CcT (s)
@Rc(s)=@LcT (s)
:
As we show in the Appendix, the expressions for c(s) for c 6= 0; s = s0 and c = 0 are similar.
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The rst-order condition (67) implies there is perfect risk-sharing between any two Northern
countries but, because of the incomplete tax constraints, there is imperfect risk-sharing either
between a Northern country and a Southern country or between any two Southern countries.
To achieve these allocations, the union levies the following portfolio taxes
(69)  iD(s) =
8<: 0 for i 2 N1
i
i(s)
U iT (s)
i 2 S
:
To see why, note that in the decentralized equilibrium with complete markets, the rst-order
conditions for consumers imply
(70)
U iT (s)[1 + 
i
D(s)]
i
=
U0T (s)[1 + 
0
D(s)]
0
;
where i is the multiplier on the asset market constraint (2). Here with  iD(s) dened by (69)
and the multiplier i set to 1=i, the decentralized rst order conditions (70) coincide with
those in the union-wide problem (67).
Proposition 3A. (Portfolio Taxes To Help Policy-Restricted Countries) A union-
wide scal authority concerned solely with insurance makes no transfers to any country and
levies portfolio taxes on the policy-restricted Southern countries solely to help ameliorate the
distortions in these policy-restricted countries.
Here the union-wide authority simply helps policy-restricted countries by levying a
less powerful tax, a portfolio tax, to partially x the limited risk-sharing implied by its
incomplete tax system. It does so only because a policy-restricted country is incapable of
levying a nontraded goods tax for itself that would undo the incomplete tax constraint.
Notice that here an active role for a union-wide authority is intimately connected to
the countries belonging to a monetary union. To see why, suppose that our countries still
belong to a scal union, but that exchange rates between member countries are exible. Here
each country i has its own nominal price P iT (s) for its traded goods, where P
i
T (s) is intended
to be the price of traded goods in the local currency of country i. For this economy with
exible exchange rates, note that even if  iN(s) is restricted to zero under the normalization
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that P iT (s0) = 1, the rst-order condition (5) implies
(71)
Ri(s)
Ri(s0)
=
U iT (s)=U
i
N(s)
U iT (s0)=U
i
N(s0)
= P iT (s):
But now the right-side of (71) varies with i so that there is no incomplete tax constraint:
allocations can be constructed ignoring this constraint and then P iT (s) can be chosen so that
it holds. We summarize this discussion with a proposition.
Proposition 3B. (Portfolio Taxes To Help Policy-Restricted Countries Unnecessary
Under Flexible Exchange Rates) Under exible exchange rates, a union-wide scal authority
concerned solely with insurance neither makes transfers nor levies portfolio taxes.
These results might lead one to conjecture, more generally, that the need to levy
portfolio taxes is intimately connected to countries belonging to a monetary union and that
these taxes o¤set cross-country externalities. The next section shows that this conjecture is
correct.
B. Portfolio Taxes without a Monetary Union
Here we consider a scal union with exible exchange rates and severe restrictions on the
policies of national governments. Specically, no countries have access to a payroll tax on
labor, the Northern countries have access to portfolio taxes, whereas Southern countries do
not. The union-wide authority, however, has the ability to levy portfolio taxes on any country
i it chooses. To make our point even starker, imagine that the price of nontraded goods is
exible rather than sticky.
Here the lack of a payroll tax means that the country no longer has an instrument
to o¤set the monopoly distortion. Thus, since nontraded goods prices are exible, the price
setting rule (12) reduces to
(72) P iN =
"
"  1
W i(s)
Ai(s)
;
which adds an extra constraint to the national governmentsproblems. In particular, using
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the consumer rst-order condition
 U
i
L(s)
U iN(s)
=
W i(s)
P iN
;
we can rewrite (72) as
(73)  U
i
L(s)
U iN(s)
=
"  1
"
Ai(s):
This monopoly distortion constraint implies that the marginal rate of substitution between
labor and nontraded goods is strictly lower than the marginal rate of transformation between
these variables.
Now, imagine repeating our analysis for this environment. Clearly, the union-wide au-
thority can simply levy the appropriate portfolio tax on each Southern country and achieve
the same allocations as when all countries have access to and use their portfolio taxes to max-
imize their residentswelfare. We summarize this discussion with the following proposition.
Proposition 4. (Portfolio Taxes to Help Policy-Restricted Countries) In this economy
with restricted instruments, a union-wide scal authority concerned solely with insurance is
necessary with complete markets only to levy the portfolio taxes that policy-restricted countries
are unable to levy for themselves.
Clearly, this proposition o¤ers a paternalistic view of the union-wide authority: South-
ern countries are unable to carry out desirable policies so the benevolent union-wide authority
has to do their job for them.
C. Policy with Self-Interested Governments
In the environments that we have so far considered, except for the international transfers,
the equilibrium does not depend on the tier of decision making at which policies are set.
For example, if instead of allowing national governments to set their country-specic scal
policies, we attributed this power to the union-wide authority, then we would obtain the
same equilibrium. We refer to this property of equilibrium as an irrelevance of delegation
of authority. The key assumptions that lead to this result is that the government of each
country maximizes the utility of the consumers of country i and the union maximizes a
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weighted-average of the utility of consumers in each country (along with the assumption
of commitment to policy and that each country as small). Here we consider self-interested
governments, namely those with objective functions that di¤er from that of consumers in
their countries, and show how the delegation of authority matters for the allocations that can
be achieved.
We modify the benchmark model as follows. Government i chooses the amount of
nontraded goods Gt to devote to government spending so that the resource constraint for
nontraded goods is now
(74) CiN(s) +G
i(s)  Ai(s)Li(s):
Consumer preferences are unchanged, in particular, consumers do not value government
spending. We model a self-interested government by assuming that the preferences of the
government of country i are given by
(75)
X
(s)W (CiN(s); G
i(s); CiT (s); L
i(s)):
The utility functionW () of the government is su¢ ciently general so that it can capture many
di¤erent types of self interest. Here we show how equilibrium is a¤ected by the delegation
of portfolio taxes by considering two environments. In both environments, we assume that
the national government sets nontraded goods taxes and transfers, and the union-wide au-
thority sets international transfers. In the national delegation model, however, the national
governments also set portfolio taxes, whereas in the union delegation model, the union-wide
authority sets these taxes. We study these alternative delegation schemes in a complete
market version of the model. As before, we drop the superscript c whenever unambiguous.
National Delegation
We start by characterizing equilibrium at the middle tier. Building on our earlier logic, given
TI and the strategies of other governments, the problem of country i becomes
max
fCiN (s);Gi(s);CiT (s);Li(s)g
X
s
(s)W i(CiN(s); G
i(s); CiT (s); L
i(s));
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subject to (74) and
X
s
Q(s)PT (s)C
i
T (s) =
X
s
Q(s)PT (s)

Y iT (s) + T
i;c
I

;
where the prices PT = PT (TI ;  i(TI)) and Q = Q(TI ;  i(TI)) are taken as given by this
government. The rst order condition for nontraded consumption, labor, and traded goods
can be summarized by
(76) W iN(s) = W
i
G(s);
(77)  W iL(s) = Ai(s)W iN(s);
(78)
(s)W iT (s)
(s0)W iT (s0)
= Q(s)PT (s);
where we have used the normalization that Q(s0) = PT (s0) = 1. The extra constraints
(76) and (77) should be thought of as self-interested governments constraints. That is, the
union-wide authority must respect the incentives of the self-interested national governments
to distort allocations away from those that maximize the utility of their consumers. The
union-wide authoritys problem is thus,
(79) max
fCiN (s);Gi(s);CiT (s);Li(s)g
Z
i
i
hX
(s)U i(CiN(s); C
i
T (s); L
i(s))
i
di;
subject to (74), (76), (77), (78), and
Z
i
CiT (s)di 
Z
i
Y iT (s)di.
The constraints in the union-wide authoritys problem capture the unions inability to control
the policies of noncooperative governments.
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Union Delegation
As before, we start by characterizing equilibrium at the middle tier. Building on our earlier
logic, given TI and the strategies of other governments, the problem of country i becomes
max
fCiN (s);Gi(s);CiT (s);Li(s)g
X
s
(s)W i(CiN(s); G
i(s); CiT (s); L
i(s));
subject to (74) and
(80)
X
s
qi(s)CiT (s) =
X
s
qi(s)

Y iT (s) + T
i;c
I

,
where qi(s) = Q(s)PT (s)=[1 +  iD(s)] is under the control of the union-wide authority. The
rst order conditions for this problem are (76), (77), and
(81)
(s)W iT (s)
(s0)W iT (s0)
= qi(s).
Critically, here the union-wide authority can set portfolio taxes in a way that completely
controls the rst-order condition governing traded goods consumption in each country. The
union-wide authoritys problem is a relaxed version of (79) since (78) is no longer a constraint.
Proposition 5. (Union Delegation of Portfolio Taxes Preferred) The welfare of the
union-wide authority is higher under the union delegation scheme than under the national
delegation scheme.
The proof is simple: the union-wide authoritys problem with national delegation is a
more constrained version of the union-wide authoritys problem with union delegation.
6. Nontraded Goods Taxes in Practice
As we have shown, when governments have access to nontraded goods taxes, there is no
need to ever levy portfolio taxes under complete markets. Here we argue that, in practice,
governments both have the ability to levy nontraded goods taxes and actually do so. In
this sense, our model does not provide a strong justication for instituting a new regime of
portfolio taxes within the European Union.
Specically, although free trade agreements in currency areas typically make it very
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di¢ cult to di¤erentially tax traded goods, they usually allow some di¤erential tax treatment of
nontraded goods. For example, in May 2009 the Council of the European Commission adopted
a directive (2009/47/EC) that permanently allowed the optional use of reduced rates for the
value-added tax (VAT) on certain labor-intensive local services, including restaurant services.
The rationale was that for such nontraded goods, there is no risk of unfair competition
between service providers in di¤erent member states. Moreover, a document of the European
Commission on VAT rates (European Commission 2009) discusses how, in practice, VAT
taxes on nontraded goods vary widely across countries and goods, as shown in Figure 1.
In addition to this varying VAT for nontraded goods, excise taxes on specic goods
also vary signicantly across countries in the European Union. Using beer as a case study
of a specic example of an excise tax, we observe that tax rates and even tax methods vary
widely by country within the European Union. For instance, several countries within the
European Union employ a progressive beer duty that allows the tax rate to vary by quantity
produced, thus e¤ectively subsidizing smaller brewers. Also, a few countries choose to allow
tax rates to vary by the percentage alcohol content of beer. Even ignoring these di¤erences,
if we look only at the VAT on beer in 2002 across select countries in the European Union,
we observe that the range of actual rates is quite wide, as depicted in Figure 2. These data
seem to suggest that the assumptions underlying the Mundell economy are not unreasonable
for the European Union.
7. Conclusion
We have argued that sophisticated nancial markets obviate the need for a union-wide author-
ity to orchestrate scal transfers across countries for insurance reasons. This result holds true
even when national governments are subject to additional constraints because of the paucity
of scal instruments available to member countries. The key idea behind these results is that
even with restricted scal instruments and noncooperative governments, no macroeconomic
externality of any kind arises across countries. If the goal of a union is to transfer ex-ante
wealth from one group of countries to another, then clearly an activist union-wide authority
is necessary to carry out such forced redistribution.
In terms of the optimal delegation of authority, as long as the objective of the noncoop-
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erative governments is to maximize the welfare of their citizens, we show that an irrelevance
of delegation of authority result holds. That is, equilibrium is unchanged if any of the labor
taxes, nontraded goods taxes, or portfolio taxes are delegated to the national governments or
the union-wide authority. If, instead, the noncooperative governments pursue self-interested
policies while the union-wide authority is benevolent, then it is typically more desirable to
delegate relatively more powers to the union-wide authority rather than to the national gov-
ernments.
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9. Appendix
Here we show more of the details behind the derivations in the text.
Set up for Proposition 3A. It is convenient to substitute out traded goods prices and write
the incomplete tax constraints as (65). Here, using logic similar to that used earlier, the
union-wide problem is to solve
max
fCiT (s);Li(s)g
Z
i
i
"X
s
(s)U i(Ai(s)Li(s); CiT (s); L
i(s); s)
#
di;
subject to the resource constraint
Z
i
CiT (s)di 
Z
i
Y iT (s)di for all s
and the incomplete tax constraints
R0(s)
R0(s0)
  R
i(s)
Ri(s0)
= 0 all i 2 S and s 6= s0;
where (s)(s) and (s)i(s) are the normalized multipliers on the resource constraint and
the incomplete tax constraints. The rst-order conditions for CiT (s) for i 2 N
(82) iU iT (s) = (s):
The rst-order conditions for Li(s) for i 2 N are
(83) Ai(s)U iN(s) + U
i
L(s) = 0:
The rst-order conditions for CiT (s) for i 2 S with i 6= 0 and s 6= s0 are
(84) iU iT (s)  i(s) = (s);
where i(s0) = 0 and
(85) i(s) = i(s)
@Ri(s)=@CiT (s)
Ri(s0)
:
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The rst-order condition for CiT (s0) for i 2 S with i 6= 0 has the form of (84) with
(86) i(s0) =
@(1=Ri(s0))
@CiT (s0)
X
s
(s)
(s0)
i(s)Ri(s):
The rst-order conditions for C0T (s) and s 6= s0 have the form of (84) with
(87) 0(s) =   1
R0(s0)
@R0(s)
@C0T (s)
Z
j2S
j(s)dj;
whereas the rst-order condition for C0T (s0) has the form of (84) with
(88) 0(s0) =  @(1=R
0(s0))
@C0T (s0)
X
s

(s)
(s0)
R0(s)
Z
j2S
j(s)dj

;
where 0(s) = 0 for all s. Let H i(s)  i [Ai(s)U iN(s) + U iL(s)] be the Pareto-weighted value
of the net marginal utility of supplying one more unit of time as labor in the nontraded goods
sector. The rst-order condition for Li(s) for i 2 S with i 6= 0 and s 6= s0 are
(89) H i(s) = i(s)
1
Ri(s0)
@Ri(s)
@LiT (s)
;
so that for i 6= 0 and s 6= s0
(90) i(s) =
H i(s)Ri(s0)
@Ri(s)=@LiT (s)
:
Substituting for i(s) into the various expressions for i(s) allows us to express i(s) directly
in terms of allocations. For example, substituting (90) into (85), and using the denition of
H i(s), gives
(91) c(s) = c [Ac(s)U cN(s) + U
c
L(s)]
@Rc(s)=@CcT (s)
@Rc(s)=@LcT (s)
;
which is expression (68) in the text.
As for the setup of the competitive equilibrium, to show how the rst-order conditions
for risk sharing can be decentralized, consider the competitive equilibrium. The consumers
44
problem is
max
fCiN (s);CiT (s);Li(s);Di(s)g
X
s
(s)U i(CiN(s); C
i
T (s); L
i(s); s)di subject to
X
s
Q(s)Di(s)  0.
In each state s, the consumer also faces a budget constraint given by
(92) (s)i(s) : [1 +  iN(s)]P
i
NC
i
N(s) + PT (s)C
i
T (s)
 W i(s)Li(s) + PT (s)

Y iT (s) + T
i(s) + T iI(s)

+ i(s) + [1 +  iD(s)]D
i(s):
Letting i be the multiplier on the asset market constraint and (s)i(s) be the normalized
multiplier on the budget constraint, the rst-order conditions for CiT (s), D
i(s), Li(s), CiN(s)
are U iT (s) = 
i(s)PT (s), iQ(s) = i(s)(s)[1+ iD(s)], U
i
L(s)+
i(s)W i(s) = 0, and U iN(s) =
i(s)[1 +  iN(s)]P
i
N . We can manipulate these conditions to obtain
U iT (s)[1 + 
i
D(s)]
i
=
U jT (s)[1 + 
j
D(s)]
j
:
Suppose that we are given the allocations from the union-wide problem with weights i and
the multipliers i(s). If we set
i(s) =
U iT (s)
i
 iD(s) for i 2 S and  iD(s) = 0 for i 2 N;
then the risk-sharing rst-order conditions in the union-wide problem and the competitive
equilibrium coincide. Q:E:D:
45
Figure 1: Reduced VAT by Country
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Source: European Commission (2009). Authors' calculations.
Figure 2: VAT on Beer in 2002 for Select Countries in the European Union
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Note: *VAT is 12% for beers with <3.5% alc. vol. in Sweden
Source: Brewers of Europe (2003).
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